Commentary for Avodah Zarah 40:13
וצריכא דאי אשמעינן אילן בהא קאמר רבי מאיר כיון דלא פסיד משהי ליה אבל האי דכי משהי לה פסיד אימא מודי ליה לר' יהודה
And all three disputes are necessary; for were we told of the case of a tree only [we might think that] in that case R. Meir states his rule, for, since the non-Jew will not lose by letting it remain in the ground, he might leave it there, but in the other case, where he would lose by letting it remain in the soil, we might think that R. Meir would agree with R. Judah.
Daf Shevui to Avodah Zarah
The Talmud now asks the question that we should anticipate—why do we need to know that they disagree in all three cases? Why couldn’t we have learned one case from the other?
The first point they make is that if we knew only of the first dispute we might have thought that R. Meir prohibits selling the tree before it is felled, because the non-Jew would not lose out by leaving the tree in the ground. But when it comes to the grain, if the grain is ripe, it must be harvested immediately. Therefore, R. Meir might agree that the Jew can sell it unharvested. The baraita teaches us that R. Meir still disagrees.
The first point they make is that if we knew only of the first dispute we might have thought that R. Meir prohibits selling the tree before it is felled, because the non-Jew would not lose out by leaving the tree in the ground. But when it comes to the grain, if the grain is ripe, it must be harvested immediately. Therefore, R. Meir might agree that the Jew can sell it unharvested. The baraita teaches us that R. Meir still disagrees.
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